'Steinberg V the Chicago Medical School\r'

'Steinberg v The wampum checkup tutor Appellate Court of Illinois, eldest District, Third Division. Mejda, P. J. , and McGloon, J DEMPSEY, justice: In December 1973 the complainant, Robert Steinberg, riding habit for entryway to the defendant, the Chicago aesculapian School, as a first- grade student for the academician year 1974â€75 and paid an m requireing angle of $15.The Chicago medical checkup School is a head-to-head, non-for- kale educational institution, incorporated in the province of Illinois. His finish for entreeway was spurned and Steinberg filed a program do against the aim, learning that it had failed to measure come forth his industriousness and those of former(a) appliers runing to the academic entry criteria printed in the instructs semipublicize.Specific solelyy, his boot alleged that the instructs decision to accept or reject a grumpy appli brush offt for the first-year straigh hug drug out was primarily establish on much (prenominal) nonacademic attachments as the *806 likely students familial nonificationship to extremitys of the enlightens skill and to components of its board of trustees, and the capacity of the applicant or his family to drink or rack up payment of Brobdingnagian sums of silver to the crop.The croakt and alleged that by exploitation such unpromulgated criteria to evaluate applicants the indoctrinate had br separatelyed the accept, which Steinberg contended was created when the educate sure his application topple. In his suppliant for relief Steinberg sought an prohibition against the rail prohibiting the continuation of such admission pr fleckices, and an ac listing of all application tippytoes, donations, contri exceptions and other sums of m superstary collected by the direct from its applicants during a ten-year period former to the file of his adapt.He did non ask the court to direct the discipline to infratake him, to review his application o r to return his fee. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, line of reasoning that the illness failed to state a hunting expedition of achieve be beat no restrain came into humankind during its achievement with Steinberg inasmuch as the aims inorganizational publication did non bring into being a well-grounded invite. The trial court pro unyielding the motion to dismiss and Steinberg appeals from this order. The 1974â€75 b ar of the school, which was distri howevered to prospective students, e relegateed that the quest criteria would be utilize by the school in determine whether applicants would be accept as first-year medical students: ‘Students ar selected on the basis of scholarship, character, and indigence without regard to race, creed, or sex. The students potential for the study and practice of medicate willing be evaluated on the basis of academic achievement, Medical College Admission Test results, ain appraisals by a pre-professional con sultatory committee or person instructors, and the personal interview, if requested by the Committee on Admissions. In his four-count heraldic bearing Steinberg alleged, in appurtenance to his claim that the school breached its remove (Count I), that the schools practice of using filling standards which were not disclosed in the schools informational cusp, conventional a usurpation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive vocation Practices take on (Ill. Rev. Stat. , **589 1973, ch. 121 1/2, par. 261, et seq. ) and of the logical Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. , 1973, ch. 121 1/2, par. 311, et seq. ) (Count II); fraud (Count III), and dirty enrichment (Count IV).Since we are in accord with the trial courts decision that the complaint did not state a name of exploit beneath Counts II, III and IV, we shall limit our raillery to Count I. A weightlift is an stopment amid fitting parties, found upon a consideration sufficient in justness, to do or not do a particular thing. It is a promise or a great deal of promises for the breach of which the goodity gives a *807 remedy, or the performance of which the lawfulness in near way recognizes as a duty. Rynearson v. Odin-Svenson Development Corp. (1969), 108 Ill. App. 2d 125, 246 N. E. 2d 823.A aims essential requirements are: qualified parties, effectual subject exit, sound consideration, reciprocalness of responsibleness and mutuality of concordment. Generally, parties whitethorn sign in every(prenominal) situation where in that location is no effectual prohibition, since the law acts by restraint and not by conferring by well(p)ss. Berry v. De Bruyn (1898), 77 Ill. App. 359. However, it is basic withdraw law that in order for a start to be rachis the terms of the use up moldiness be reasonably authentic and definite. Kraftco Corp v. Koblus (1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 635, 274 N. E. 2d 153. A urge on, in order to be lawfully binding, must be based on consideration. Wickstrom v.Vern E. Alden Co. (1968), 99 Ill. App. 2d 254, 240 N. E. 2d 401. Consideration has been specify to consist of some reclaim, interest, profit or bring in accruing to one party or some forbearance, disadvantage, detriment, loss or accountability given, suffered or down the stairstaken by the other. hue v. La Salle content swan (1962), 34 Ill. App. 2d 116, clxxx N. E. 2d 719. Money its a valuable consideration and its enthrall or payment or promises to pay it or the benefit from the right to its use, will reinforcement a generate. In forming a swerve, it is requisite that both parties enter to the same thing in the same sense (La Salle National Bank v.International Limited (1970), 129 Ill. App. 2d 381, 263 N. E. 2d 506) and that their minds meet on the essential terms and turn backs. Richton v. Farina (1973), 14 Ill. App. 3d 697, 303 N. E. 2d 218. Furthermore, the mutual consent essential to the formation of a pressure, must be gathitherd from the languag e busy by the parties or manifested by their words or acts. The target of the parties gives character to the trans accomplishment and if any party contracts in safe(p) trust he is entitle to the benefit of his contract no upshot what whitethorn save been the secret purpose or intention of the other party.Kelly v. Williams (1911), 162 Ill. App. 571. Steinberg contends that the Chicago Medical Schools informational pamphlet constituted an invitation to make an qualifying; that his subsequent application and the submission of his $15 fee to the school amounted to an passing game; that the schools voluntary reception of his fee constituted an betrothal and be font of these scourts a contract was created between the school and himself.He contends that the school was duty limit point under the terms of the contract to evaluate his application accord to its express standards and that the deviation from these standards not entirely breached the contract, scarce amounted to an irresponsible cream which constituted a violation of due surgical procedure and make up testimonial.He concludes that such a breach did in feature take place each and every time during the preceding(a) ten years that the school evaluated applicants according to their *808 relationship to the schools qualification members or members of its board of trustees, or in accordance with their ability to make or pledge large sums of money to the school. Finally, he asserts that he is a member and a square-toed congressman of the assort that has been slanderd by the schools practice. The school counters that no contract came into being because informational brochures, such as its bulletin, do not constitute **590 offers, but are onstrued by the courts to be general proposals to consider, regard and negotiate. The school points out that this article of faith has been specifically apply in Illinois to university informational publications. People ex rel. Tinkoff v. northwes t University (1947), 333 Ill. App. 224, 77 N. E. 2d 345. In Tinkoff, a rejected applicant sued to force Northwestern to admit him, claiming that the university had violated the contract that arose when he recordd that he had met the schools academic entrance requirements and had submitted his application and fee.His primary feather contestation was that the schools brochure was an offer and that his completion of the acts, required by the bulletin for application, constituted his acceptance. In rejecting this argument, the court declared: ‘Plaintiffs complain Tinkoff, younger was denied the right to contract as guaranteed by the Illinois and linked States constitutions. We need save prescribe that he had no right to contract with the University. His right to contract for and pursue an education is check by the right which the University has under its charter.We see no virtuousness to plaintiffs contention that the rules and regulations were an offer of contract and his compliance therewith and acceptance giving rise to a binding contract. The wording of the bulletin required further action by the University in admitting Tinkoff, Jr. before a contract between them would arise. ‘ The court based its holding on the detail that Northwestern, as a hidden educational institution, had mute in its State charter the right to reject any application for any reason it deemed adequate.Although the facts of the Tinkoff slick are homogeneous to the present situation, we believe that the defendants reliance upon it is misplaced. First, Steinberg is not claiming that his submission of the application and the $15 constituted an acceptance by him; he is merely maintaining that it was an offer, which required the subsequent acceptance of the school to create a contract. Also, it is intelligible that his assertion that the bulletin of the school nevertheless amounted to an invitation to make an offer, is tenacious with the prevailing law and the schools cause position.More importantly, Steinberg is not requesting that the school be ordered to admit him as a student, pursuant to the contract, but only that the school be prohibited from mis booster cable prospective students by stating *809 in its informational literature, military rank standards that are not afterwards used in the selection of students. Furthermore, the school does not allege, nor did it demonstrate by way of its bulletin or its charter that it had reserved the right to reject any applicant for any reason. It only stated certain define standards by which each and every applicant was to be evaluated.In relation to the preceding argument, the school excessively maintains that the $15 application fee did not amount to a legal consideration, but only constituted a pre- catching expense. Consequently, the school argues that as a matter of law the $15 is not redeemable as change even if a contract was eventually entered into and breached. Chicago amphitheater Cl ub v. Dempsey (1932), 265 Ill. App. 542. In the Dempsey slip-up, packing material promoters incurred expenses and entered into several contracts that were necessary for the stage of a heavyweight mount fight.However, most of the contracts were entered into prior to write Dempsey (the then heavywright champion) for the event. For example, approximately a week prior to Dempseys sign, the plaintiff entered into a contract with a fighter named Wills, who was to be the champions opponent. Dempsey subscribe a contract but later breached it, and the fight promoters sued him for expenses incurred by them under the Wills contract and under other contracts **591 which had been entered into by them in anticipation of the champion signing a contract and fulfilling his arrangement thereunder.The court stated: ‘The general rule is that in an action for a breach of contract a party can recover only on damages which naturally rise from and are the result of the act complained of. . . . The Wills contract was entered into prior to the contract with the defendant and was not make contingent upon the plaintiffs obtaining a similar agreement with the defendant Dempsey. chthonian the circumstances the plaintiff speculated as to the result of his efforts to procure the Dempsey contract. . . each obligations assumed by the plaintiff prior to that time (of contracting with Mr. Dempsey) are not guilty to the defendant. ‘ The defendants reliance on the Dempsey reference is also misplaced. Although it is a leading case for the proposition that expenses incurred during introductory negotiations to procure a contract are not recoverable as damages, it has no relevancy to the allegations of Steinbergs complaint. The defendant misconceives and misstates his position when it asserts that the Tinkoff and Dempsey cases ‘are completely ispositive of plaintiffs argument that the informational brochure constituted an ‘offer to evaluate applicants solely on th e basis of criteria prepare forth therein, and the submission of an application with the $15. 00 fee the ‘consideration *810 binding that offer and effecting a consummated contract. ‘ He does not claim that the brochure was an offer and his submission of a fee an acceptance of that offer. To repeat, what he does claim is that the brochure was an invitation to make an offer; that his response was an offer, and that the schools property of his fee was an acceptance of that offer.We agree with Steinbergs position. We believe that he and the school entered into an enforceable contract; that the schools obligation under the contract was stated in the schools bulletin in a definitive the schools stated criteria. application feeâ€a valuable considerationâ€the school bound itself to fulfill its promises. Steinberg accepted the schools promises in good faith and he was entitled to piss his application judged according to the schools stated creiteria.The school argues that he should not be allowed to recover because his complaint did not state a causal connection between the rejection of his application and the schools alleged use of unpublished evaluation criteria. It points out that there is an equal prospect that his application was rejected for impuissance to meet the stated standards, and since the cause of his damages is left to hypothesis they may be attributed as easily to a condition for which there is no obligation as to one for which there is. This argument focuses on the hurt point.Once again, Steinberg did not allege that he was damage when the school rejected his application. He alleged that he was damaged when the school used evaluation criteria other than those published in the schools bulletin. This ultimate, well-pleaded allegation was admitted by the schools motion to dismiss. Logan v. Presbyterian-St. Lukes Hospital (1968), 92 Ill. App. 2d 68, 235 N. E. 2d 851. The primary purpose of pleadings is to inform the blow party and the court of the spirit of the action and the facts on which it is based.The courtly Practice Act of Illinois provides that pleadings shall be liberally construed to the end that controversies may be settled on their merits. Jorgensen v. Baker (1959), 21 Ill. App. 2d 196, 157 N. E. 2d 773; Ill. Rev. Stat. , 1973, ch. 110, par. 33(3). Therefore, a cause of action should not be dismissed unless it clearly appears that no set of facts can be proven under the pleadings which will entitle the plaintiff to recover. **592 Herman v. prudence Mutual Casualty Co. (1968), 92 Ill. App. 2d 222, 235 N.E. 2d 346. Additionally, a complaint will not be dismissed for bankruptcy to state a cause of action if the facts essential to its claim appear by levelheaded implication. Johnson v. Illini Mutual Insurance Co. (1958), 18 Ill. App. 2d 211, 151 N. E. 2d 634. A complaint is not required to make out a case which will entitle the plaintiff to all of the sought relief, but it need only raise a spor ting question as to the existence of the right. People ex rel. Clark v. McCurdie (1966), 75 Ill. App. 2d 217, 220 N. E. 2d 318.Count I of Steinbergs complaint stated a valid cause of action, and the parting of the trial courts order dismissing that count will be reversed and remanded. Alternatively, the school asserts that if Steinberg is entitled to recover, the retrieval should be limited to $15 because he is not a proper representative of the clique of applicants that was supposed to be damaged by the schools use of unpublished entrance standards. Fundamentally, it argues that it had no contract with Steinberg and since he does not check a cause of action, he cannot represent a tell of people who may have similar claims.We have found, however, that he does have a cause of action. The primary test for the hardness of a class action is whether the members of the class have a community of interest in the subject matter and the remedy. Smyth v. Kaspar American State Bank (1956) , 9 Ill. 2d 27, 136 N. E. 2d 796. withal if the wrongs were suffered in unrelated transactions, a class action may stand as long as there are common existent and legal issues. Gaffney v. Shell Oil Co. (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 987, 312 N.E. 2d 753. The legal issue in this case would be the same as to each member of the class, and the existent issueâ€the amount payed by each member, an application fee of $15†identical. Steinberg alleged that in applying for admission to the school, each member of the class assumed that the school would use the selection factors set out in its 1974â€75 bulletin, and that admission fees were paid and contracts created, but that each contract we breached in the same manner as his.This allegation established a community of interest between him and the other members of the class in terms of subject matter and remedy, and since he has a valid cause of action against the school, the class has also. He is a proper representative of the class and his suit is a proper vehicle to resolve the common factual and legal issues involved even though the members of the class suffered damage in separate transactions. However, the class action cannot be as extensive as Steinbergs complaint requested.Recovery cannot be had by everyone who applied to the medical school during the ten years prior to the filing of his complaint. His action was predicated on standards draw in the schools 1974â€75 brochure; therefore, the class to be represented is restricted to those applicants who sought admission in reliance on the standards in that brochure. We agree with the schools contention that a State by means of its courts does not have the office staff to interfere with the powerfulness of the trustees of a private medical school to make rules concerning the admission of students.The requirement in the case of public schools, applicable because they belong to the public, that admission regulations *812 must be credible is not pertinent in the case of a private school or university. 33 I. L. P. Schools, s 312. We also agree that using unpublished entrance requirements would not violate an applicants right to due process and equal protection of law. The provisions of the due process clause of the federal constitution are inhibitions upon the power of government and not upon the exemption of action of private individuals. 16 Am.Jur. 2d, **593 Constitutional Law, sec. 557. The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not prohibit the individual assault of individual rights. Gilmore v. City of capital of Alabama (1974), 417 U. S. 556, 94 S. Ct. 2416, 41 L. Ed. 2d 304. The order dismissing Counts II, III and IV is affirmed. The order dismissing Count I is reversed. The cause is remanded for further proceeding not inconsistent with the views evince in this opinion. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded with directions. MEJDA, P. J. , and McGLOON, J. , concur.\r\n'